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I
This year marks the tenth anniversary of Bowers v. Hardwick,' in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee
a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.2 Since Bowers, judicial
and legislative controversies over society's treatment of gay men and lesbians
have intensified In the context of these often-bitter disputes, Andrew
Sullivan's Virtually Normal responds to the question of how society should
deal with its homosexual minority (p. 18). Sullivan argues that all public
discrimination against homosexuals should be eliminated, but he rejects the
pursuit of laws that would prevent private parties from discriminating in areas
such as employment and housing (p. 111). 4 He thus articulates what might be
termed a "classic" liberal position, in which the state takes a "neutral" position
with regard to sexual orientation.
Sullivan develops a series of powerful responses to the most common
arguments launched against gay men and lesbians. Virtually Normal thus
provides valuable ammunition for the battles over lesbian and gay equality, and
Sullivan offers an interesting rhetorical model for how lesbians and gay men
might best respond to their legal and political challenges. Ultimately however,
Sullivan's argument rests on definitional assumptions that do not reflect legal
reality. Moreover, his exclusion of antidiscrimination civil rights laws from his
* Editor, The New Republic.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. Id. at 191.
3. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)
(excluding gay and lesbian group from Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade); Able v. United States, 880 F.
Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding military's policy of excluding openly gay and lesbian service personnel
to be unconstitutional violation of free speech and equal protection), appeal docketed, No. 95-6111 (2d Cir.
Jan. 16, 1996); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (striking down state constitutional amendment
eliminating laws prohibiting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (No. 94-1039) (argued Oct. 10, 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (subjecting
Hawaii's prohibition of same-sex marriage to strict scrutiny under state equal protection doctrine).
4. Sullivan's argument thus does not support the addition of "sexual orientation" to federal civil rights
statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994) (employment discrimination); id. § 3604 (1994)
(housing discrimination). Legislation to eliminate private employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation has been proposed in Congress and formally endorsed by President Clinton. See Steven A.
Holmes, Clinton Backs Bill to Protect Homosexuals from Job Bias, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at Al.
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politics lacks a principled basis and exposes the weaknesses of his own
argument.
II
Sullivan builds his argument about homosexuality by exploring and
critiquing what he identifies as four modem theories of how society should
handle its gay and lesbian members. He labels these theories "prohibitionist"
(p. 19), "liberationist" (p. 56), "conservative" (p. 94), and "liberal" (p. 133).
After examining these four viewpoints, Sullivan presents his own "politics of
homosexuality" (p. 169) as a reasoned response to the other theories'
deficiencies.
Prohibitionists, according to Sullivan, view homosexuality as an aberration
(p. 20). They believe that homosexual acts should be punished and that society
should structure itself to discourage the "temptation" to engage in such acts
(pp. 21-22).5 They view homosexuality as a choice that should be socially
disfavored (p. 25). In response, Sullivan chides those who would rely on the
Bible to outlaw homosexual conduct as picking and choosing from the Bible's
various prohibitions (pp. 27-28). He then confronts the natural law
condemnation of homosexuality by explaining both that homosexual conduct
appears throughout history (and thus cannot be properly considered unnatural)
(p. 33) and that modem Western societies do not look to the procreative nature
of sexual conduct to establish its legality (p. 54).6
Moving to the other end of the political spectrum, Sullivan examines the
liberationist position. Drawing on Michel Foucault's ideas of social
construction,7 the liberationists argue that majority culture has constructed the
term "homosexual" to categorize and control sexual behavior (pp. 63, 66-67).
Liberationists thus seek an end to sexual categories and a return to the more
amorphous concept of "pleasures. 8 While granting the intellectual appeal of
liberationism (pp. 66-67), Sullivan attacks the theory's pessimistic view of
dominant power structures by pointing to the advances that lesbians and gay
men have made toward equality (pp. 75-76). Sullivan also points out the
inherent irony in liberationist politics, in that, while attempting to cast away
5. Eve Sedgwick characterizes this belief as a minoritizing-universalizing strategy that persecutes the
allegedly small minority of people who "really are" homosexual, while simultaneously discouraging the
much larger (universalized) group of people who might be tempted to engage in homosexual acts from
doing so. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 85 (1990).
6. Supreme Court precedents establishing the right to obtain contraceptives, see Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and a woman's right to abortion, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), bolster Sullivan's argument.
7. See I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1978).
8. 1 id. at 157.
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oppressive power structures, liberationists are virtually obligated to play power
games themselves (pp. 77, 92).
Sullivan distinguishes the third group, conservatives, from prohibitionists
because conservatives do not believe that homosexual conduct should be
criminalized or that homosexuality is necessarily a choice (pp. 96-97). Rather,
conservatives maintain that public acceptance of homosexuality undermines
heterosexual coupling (p. 104), that heterosexuality leads to a comparatively
superior lifestyle (p. 105), and consequently that public policies ought to
encourage heterosexuality and discourage homosexuality (pp. 97, 101). 9
Sullivan attacks this argument by exposing the tautology inherent in
heterosexuality's claimed superiority (pp. 106-07). He explains, "It is precisely
because of societal disapproval of homosexuals that careers may be affected
and that marriage is an impossibility and that family life is discouraged" (p.
116). Sullivan also disputes the notion that public acceptance of homosexuality
undermines heterosexual coupling or the family (p. 104).
Sullivan finally examines liberal politics. He characterizes modem liberals
as having begun with the classic position of state neutrality (pp. 138-39) but
having later abandoned this philosophy, reasoning that this neutrality in fact
amounted to "acquiescence" to preexisting social inequalities (p. 141). Liberals
thus seek to provide homosexuals with certain rights, such as privacy, free
expression, and equal employment opportunity (p. 136). Sullivan claims that
the liberal position, by entangling itself in the value-laden conflict over private-
sector gay and lesbian rights, inevitably leads to a degeneration of political
discourse into a debate "between 'perverts' and 'bigots"' (p. 160). Finally,
Sullivan asserts that liberals' focus on ending private discrimination represents,
at best, a misplacement of priorities, since gay men and lesbians do not even
possess basic public equality (p. 163).
With these critiques in mind, Sullivan advances his own argument. Starting
from an assumption of involuntary homosexuality (p. 170), Sullivan proposes
"that all public (as opposed to private) discrimination against homosexuals be
ended and that every right and responsibility that heterosexuals enjoy as public
citizens be extended to those who grow up and find themselves emotionally
different. And that is all" (p. 171). Sullivan states that ending the ban on
openly gay and lesbian service personnel and legalizing same-sex marriage are
the most critical aspects of his politics, as these two steps would undo the most
visible social condemnations of homosexuality (pp. 173, 178). He claims that
9. The U.S. military's policy toward homosexuals represents just such a system that tolerates private
homosexuality but provides strong disincentives for those who would publicly reveal their sexual
orientation. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1995); see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[Petitioner] was
discharged merely because she is bisexual and revealed this fact to acquaintances at her workplace.");
Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247,255 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[A]ppellant's employment
was not terminated because of his status as a homosexual .... [T]he discharge was the result of appellant's
'openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life ... '), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
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his politics evades modem liberals' legitimacy quandary by reshaping the
debate from one about protection of individual rights to one about public
equality (pp. 176-77). Sullivan thus frames his argument as a rhetorical tool
to be used in the political dispute over society's treatment of lesbians and gay
men. He rejects the enactment of antidiscrimination laws to prevent private
discrimination (p. 171), arguing that these laws entangle the government in a
subject that is "too deep, too emotional, too visceral to be resolved by the calm
voice of liberal legalism" (p. 158).
1I
Sullivan does an exceptional job of reframing the homosexuality debate
from a discussion of rights to a discussion of equality. But while his argument
has considerable appeal, its force fades in a legal and political world where the
very definitions of "homosexual," "public," and "neutrality" upon which
Sullivan relies remain deeply controversial. To be fair, Sullivan does not claim
to make a legal argument. However, to be effective, his argument must
confront the legal obstacles that stand in the way of gay and lesbian equality.
In holding that the Constitution does not protect homosexual sodomy from
state prohibitions,'t the Supreme Court rejected one of Sullivan's most basic
prescriptions-eradicating sodomy laws (p. 171). The Bowers decision remains
one of the most criticized Supreme Court decisions in history" and arguably
would not come out the same way today.'2 Nevertheless, the decision presents
an enormous jurisprudential barrier to Sullivan's argument.'
3
Because Bowers v. Hardwick was argued and lost on due process
grounds, 14 an equal protection argument may be a logical choice for those
seeking to litigate around Bowers. But this strategy would likely require
convincing the Supreme Court that homosexuality is "immutable," as this
factor is key under equal protection doctrine. 5 If society accepted Sullivan's
assumption that homosexuality is not a choice (p. 170), equal protection
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
11. For strong critiques of Bowers, see generally Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality and
Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073
(1988); Thomas Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHi. L. REV.
648 (1987).
12. See Nostradamus and Robert Bork, THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 6, 1996, at 14 (citing Robert Bork's
claim that current Supreme Court would not rule same way on Bowers).
13. In fact, to the extent that Sullivan defines homosexuality in terms of sexual attraction, the Court
arguably rejected all of Sullivan's argument. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If
the [Supreme] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the
class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state-sponsored discrimination against the class
is invidious."). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1439 (9th Cir.) (refusing to apply
Bowers by distinguishing between homosexual conduct and sexual orientation), amended, 847 F2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on different grounds en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
957 (1990).
14. 478 U.S. at 189.
15. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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doctrine would likely provide the very levels of public equality that Sullivan
seeks. But the legal reality is that homosexuality is not universally accepted as
an innate identity trait. 16 His argument is thus weakened to the extent that it
rests on an assumption of immutability that has yet to gain widespread
acceptance in the courts.
Sullivan rejects laws barring private discrimination against lesbians and
gay men, arguing that these laws are too controversial and are unfaithful to the
ideals of classic liberalism. This position is both pragmatically questionable
and ideologically inconsistent. Sullivan asserts that the bitter controversy
surrounding homosexuality makes it an unwise target for civil rights
protections (pp. 158, 162-63). However, his proposal to end all forms of
public discrimination is no less "emotional" or "visceral" than establishing
private antidiscrimination laws. In fact, poll data indicate that people are much
more likely to oppose same-sex marriage than they are to oppose applying
employment nondiscrimination statutes to lesbians and gay men.' 7 If Sullivan
is correct in his assertion that legalizing same-sex marriage would move
lesbians and gay men "ninety percent" of the way toward equality (p. 185),
then logically their opponents will fight hardest against this position.
In addition to its practical weaknesses, Sullivan's argument fails to offer
a principled explanation of why private civil rights protections ought not be
extended to cover sexual orientation. Sullivan accurately points out that
homosexuality is a complex social phenomenon (p. 149) and that it differs
from other minority characteristics since it can be concealed and is not strictly
transgenerational (pp. 151-53).' s Yet neither of these attributes decreases the
sting of discrimination to render homosexuality less worthy of civil rights
protections.' 9 Sullivan suggests that enforcing antidiscrimination laws to
protect sexual orientation in the private employment and housing contexts is
particularly problematic because this "trait," unlike other protected
characteristics, involves behavior (p. 161). However, the argument that such
laws have either the purpose or effect of forcing employers or landlords to
observe or even approve of homosexual behavior "is, at best, facetious." 20
Furthermore, if one assumes, as does Sullivan, that homosexuality is
16. Compare High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding homosexuality not immutable for purposes of equal protection) with Watkins, 837 F.2d at
1446 (holding homosexuality immutable characteristic for purposes of equal protection).
17. See, e.g., William A. Henry, III, Pride and Prejudice, TIME, June 27, 1994, at 54, 58 (indicating
much broader public support for antidiscrimination laws than for legalized same-sex marriage); Put on Your
Helmets for the Culture War, FORTUNE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 60 ("On gay rights, a clear majority oppose
discrimination on the job, but balk at legalizing marriage for homosexual couples.").
18. For further explication of the uniqueness of homosexuality as a minoritizing trait, see SEDGWICK,
supra note 5, at 75.
19. In fact, Sullivan implies that the experiences of gay and lesbian adolescents may actually be worse
than those of ethnic minorities, because homosexual adolescents lack peer support networks and must
confront a minoritizing trait that society views as morally nonneutral (pp. 154-55).
20. I borrow here Justice White's infamous language in Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (characterizing
Hardwick's argument that right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy is fundamental).
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involuntary, it would seem that the more bitter the opposition to homosexuals,
the more in need of equal protection they would be.
Sullivan's fallback position is that the state should "fully respect
liberalism's public-private distinction" (p. 171) and not enmesh itself in the
ugly debate over homosexuality. But this very distinction is untenable.
Ironically, Sullivan's reliance on same-sex marriage as the pathway to public
equality (p. 185) demonstrates his failure to understand the inherent
malleability of government "neutrality" and the public-private distinction.
Government recognition of any marriage is an inherently nonneutral act, as it
encourages binary, exclusive coupling through a variety of economic
incentives. Marriage also infuses a variety of public rights and duties into the
most private of human relationships. Sullivan's contention that the government
should promote both heterosexual and same-sex marriage thus illustrates how
easily one can come to view a policy as "neutral" and "public" when the
majority favors the values that the policy promotes.
Despite its flaws, Virtually Normal's typology of gay and lesbian political
theories does facilitate a clearer understanding of these issues. Whether
consciously or not, Sullivan deploys his argument in a manner that would
leave Foucault and Sedgwick smiling. Sullivan turns the tables on the
adversaries of gay and lesbian equality by defining and categorizing their
politics in much the same way that they define and categorize his
homosexuality. By dividing homosexual politics into four "camps," he isolates
each theory's weak points, rendering it vulnerable to attack. He then develops
his own theory that arguably transcends the other positions' weaknesses.
Sullivan "minoritizes" his opponents into political boxes, while simultaneously
"universalizing" his argument's appeal to liberal democracy and state
neutrality. Ironically, then, while rejecting liberationist conclusions about the
social labeling and control of homosexuals, Sullivan develops categories of
homosexual politics to label and rhetorically control his opponents.
-Bradley P. Smith
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